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Abstract. 
Recently, some transportation service providers attempt to integrate the ride services offered by multiple 
independent ride-sourcing platforms, and passengers are able to request ride through such third-party 
integrators or connectors and receive service from any one of the platforms. This novel business model, termed 
as third-party platform-integration in this paper, has potentials to alleviate the cost of market fragmentation 
due to the demand splitting among multiple platforms. While most existing studies focus on the operation 
strategies for one single monopolist platform, much less is known about the competition and platform-
integration as well as the implications on operation strategy and system efficiency. In this paper, we propose 
mathematical models to describe the ride-sourcing market with multiple competing platforms and compare 
system performance metrics between two market scenarios, i.e., with and without platform-integration, at 
Nash equilibrium as well as social optimum. We find that platform-integration can increase total realized 
demand and social welfare at both Nash equilibrium and social optimum, but may not necessarily generate a 
greater profit when vehicle supply is sufficiently large or/and market is too fragmented. We show that the 
market with platform-integration generally achieves greater social welfare. On one hand, the integrator in 
platform-integration is able to generate a thicker market and reduce matching frictions; on the other hand, 
multiple platforms are still competing by independently setting their prices, which help to mitigate monopoly 
mark-up as in the monopoly market.  
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1. Introduction 
Over the past few years, the rise of ride-sourcing services has disruptively reshaped the way people travel and 
made substantial impacts on traditional taxi industry and multimodal transportation system. Due to the low 
barrier under less restrictive entry permit, multiple ride-sourcing companies co-exist and compete with each 
other in many local markets. For example, Didi and Uber had been involved in fierce competition in China 
until the end of 2016 when Uber China was acquired by Didi. After that, although Didi accounts for the largest 
market share in China, it continuously faces challenges from new rivals, such as Meituan which expands its 
ride-sourcing services to a handful of cities in eastern China. By 2019, there are competitions between ride-
sourcing companies all over the world, including Uber and Lyft in the United States, Grab and Go-Jek in 
Southeastern Asia, Uber and Bolt in Europe, Uber and Didi in Australia, Careem and Uber in the Middle East, 
Ola and Uber in India, and 99 Taxi, Cabify, and Uber in Brazil (Wang and Yang, 2019). 
Competition is a double-edged sword for ride-sourcing markets. On one hand, similar to other service markets, 
competition in the ride-sourcing markets prevents a monopolist platform from greedily maximizing its own 
profit by distorting the operating strategies from the system efficient levels. On the other hand, competition 
between platforms leads to market fragmentation and increases matching frictions. Specifically, matching 
between demand and supply in ride-sourcing markets generally exhibits increasing returns to scale, namely, 
matching is more efficient as more passengers and drivers are involved in one platform, and therefore it is 
expected that the demand splitting between multiple independent platforms may result in certain market 
inefficiency.  
Recently, there arises a novel business model, termed as platform-integration, which has potentials to address 
the market fragmentation under competition. It integrates ride-sourcing services offered by multiple 
companies in one APP interface as an integrator. For example, Baidu Map integrates the services of Didi and 
some smaller ride-sourcing companies into its APP and offer its users a wide variety of choices in China (Song, 
2019). Without platform-integration, a passenger often requests a ride on one platform and thus can only be 
matched with an idle driver affiliated to that specific platform; with platform-integration, a passenger is able 
to request a ride through the platform integrator and can be matched with an idle driver affiliated to any of the 
integrated ride-sourcing platforms (e.g. Didi or Meituan). As a result, the accessible supply level for a 
passenger is higher on the integrator, and the average pick-up distance/time is expected to decline. 
In actual operations, passengers may have freedom to choose the full set of ride-sourcing platforms displayed 
in the integrator (referred to as full platform-integration), or a subset of these platforms (referred to as partial 
platform-integration). In this paper, for analytical tractability, we restrict our analysis to the case of full 
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platform-integration. It is worth noting that platform-integration is a novel business model that differs from 
multi-homing in that, passengers who opt for platform-integration can request ride on multiple platforms 
through one integrator interface, while passengers who opt for multi-homing patronize different platforms by 
switching APPs (once a driver is dispatched from a specific platform, passengers need to cancel requests on 
other platforms). On the supply side, drivers in market scenario with platform-integration are still affiliated to 
only one specific platform and get paid based on its (i.e., that specific platform’s) corresponding pricing and 
incentives strategy, while drivers who opt for multi-homing are simultaneously affiliated to more than one 
platforms and get paid from the platform from which an order is dispatched. It is also worth noting that the 
platform-integration is different from simply merging the platforms in competition. In market scenario with 
platform-integration, the participating platforms still have freedom to determine their trip fares and other 
operating strategies while sharing some information (e.g. locations of idle drivers) to the integrator. By 
contrast, in the scenario of platform merging, some platforms are turned into one single platform to get 
competitive advantage and no longer make individual pricing and operating decisions; in an extreme case 
where all platforms are merged, the market essentially becomes a monopoly market. In a sense, the platform-
integration is able to (1) maintain the competition between platforms and prevent them greedily grapping too 
much profits and (2) reduce the market fragmentation in the meantime.  
Of particular interest is to understand the implications of platform-integration on platform’s operating 
strategies and the resulting passenger demand, platform profit, and social welfare. Platform-integration is 
generally expected to improve system efficiency with increased market thickness on the integrator. However, 
the competing and integrated platforms may adjust their operating strategies (e.g., trip fare) in response to the 
potential change of system efficiency, which may in turn affect the market equilibrium and the degree of 
efficiency improvement. This intricate feedback loops raise the need for trackable mathematical models.   
To address these challenges, in this paper we propose mathematical models to describe the ride-sourcing 
market with multiple competing platforms, and compare vehicle utilization rate, realized demand, the profit 
and social welfare in two markets scenarios: (1) competitive market without platform-integration; and (2) 
competitive market with platform-integration. We prove that platform-integration is able to increase total 
realized demand and social welfare at both Nash equilibrium and social optimum, since it can eliminate the 
market fragmentation cost but still maintain the competitions to avoid the platforms arrogating profits from 
the market. However, platform-integration may not increase platform profit when the market is too fragmented 
(i.e., when the number of platforms is large), in which platforms may face severe competitions and are forced 
to set an extremely low trip fare. In addition, we conduct some numerical studies to investigate the effects of 
the commission fee charged by the integrator from the ride-sourcing platforms on the market measures in a 
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general mixed market where some passengers use ride-sourcing services via the integrator, and others directly 
request orders through the ride-sourcing platforms. Useful managerial insights obtained from both theoretical 
and numerical studies can help the platforms and the government to design appropriate operating strategies 
for maximizing platform profit and social welfare, respectively.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature related to our study. Section 3 
presents stationary equilibrium models and optimal operating strategies at Nash equilibrium or social optimum, 
in scenarios with and without platform-integration. Section 4 analytically compares the optimal strategies and 
the corresponding profit, consumer surplus and social welfare. Section 5 provides numerical studies to 
illustrate the theoretical results and demonstrate to what extent the supply and market fragmentation affect the 
performance of platform-integration, and investigate the impacts of commission fee in the general mixed 
market equilibrium; Section 6 concludes the paper and outlooks on future research. 
 
2. Literature review 
As pioneers in sharing economy, ride-sourcing services have attracted attentions from researchers in various 
disciplines, including transportation engineering, operations research, computer science, economics, and 
management science. General research issues investigated so far include market equilibrium analysis in both 
aggregate (Zha et al., 2016) and disaggregate settings (He et al., 2018); supply and demand coordination with 
price and wage (Bai et al., 2019; Taylor, 2018; Yang et al., 2020b); homogenous and/or heterogeneous price 
and wage over space and time (Cachon et al., 2015; Castillo et al., 2017; Bimpikis et al., 2019); matching and 
dispatching strategy (Xu et al., 2017; Zha et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2018; Lyu et al. 2019; Yang et al., 2020a); 
driver supply and elasticity with respect to income level and other factors (Chen and Sheldon, 2016; Zha et 
al., 2017; Sun et al., 2019a; Sun et al., 2019b); implications of autonomy and electrification on shared mobility 
services (Ke et al., 2019; Al-Kanj et al., 2020); integration of shared mobility services with public transit 
system and parking infrastructure (Xu et al., 2017; Zhu et al, 2020); ridepooling ride-sourcing services (Ke et 
al, 2020). Readers may refer to Wang and Yang (2019) for a comprehensive review of research problems in 
ride-sourcing markets. It is noteworthy that most of these studies focus on a market with one single monopolist 
platform that has the market power to achieve a monopoly optimum by tuning the trip fares, wages, and 
matching strategies.  
So far, only a few studies have been devoted to the analysis of the ride-sourcing market with platform 
competitions. For example, Zha et al. (2016) study a duopoly market, where a Nash equilibrium is reached at 
  
5 
which the two platforms cannot unilaterally change their decisions (trip fare and vehicle fleet size) to further 
increase their profits. They argue that competition does not necessarily lower the trip fare or increase the social 
welfare because competition segments the groups of passengers and drivers and thus increases matching 
frictions. Cohen and Zhang (2017) investigate a duopoly market in which two ride-sourcing platforms choose 
their trip fares charged to passengers and wages paid to drivers and compete for both demand and supply. 
Séjourné et al. (2019) show that the splitting of demand between different platforms in essence makes the 
market thinner, and thus leads to inefficiency resulting from market fragmentation.  
There is a rich body of literature in economics on the general two-sided market (Rochet and Ti- role, 2003; 
Armstrong, 2006; Armstrong and Wright, 2007) relevant to platform-integration. Some seminal models are 
extended to analyze the ride-sharing and ride-sourcing markets. For example, Jeitschko and Tremblay (2019) 
study the two-sided market at which passengers endogenously determine whether they only patronize one 
platform or simultaneously two competing platforms, and show that passengers prefer the platform which 
offers a lower price. Bernstein et al. (2019) examine the multi-homing on the supply side. Specifically, they 
analyze and compare two settings, one with drivers serving passengers on one platform, and the other with 
drivers serving passengers on both platforms. They find that, an individual driver may increase his/her income 
by choosing multi-homing, but no drivers will become better off if all of them choose multi-homing. In general, 
these studies develop stylized models to describe two groups of agents (i.e., demand and supply in markets) 
and offer interesting managerial insights. They do not characterize certain specific process in the ride-sourcing 
market, e.g., the matching between drivers and passengers, and thus may result in some biased conclusions in 
the ride-sourcing context. 
 
3. Market equilibrium and optimal strategy 
In this section, we first present a model to describe the equilibrium of a market without platform-integration, 
and then extend the model to delineate the equilibrium of a market with platform-integration. We study the 
optimal strategies for maximizing platform profit and social welfare respectively, namely, the Nash 
equilibrium and social optimum. 
3.1. Market without platform-integration 
Consider a ride-sourcing market with 𝐼 competing platforms (𝑖 = 1,2, ⋯ , 𝐼), a group of passengers and a 
group of drivers affiliated to only one specific platform. In the market without platform-integration, a driver 
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only works for one particular platform and a passenger only sends ride request to one platform for a particular 
trip. Let 𝑄 = ?̅?𝑓(𝐶)  represent the demand function, where ?̅?  is maximum possible demand (i.e., the 
potential arrival rate of passengers), 𝑓(∙) is a decreasing function of a generalized cost 𝐶, and 𝑄 is realized 
passenger demand, i.e., the actual arrival rate of passengers in the ride-sourcing market regardless of which 
platform they choose. Then the inverse demand function (denoted by 𝐵(𝑄)) can be given by 𝐵(𝑄) =
𝑓−1(𝑄/?̅?). Let 𝑞𝑖 ≥ 0 denote the realized demand for platform 𝑖, then we have 𝑄 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑖 . Passengers are 
assumed to be homogenous in terms of their value of time (𝛽). Each platform 𝑖 chooses the trip fare 𝐹𝑖 to 
maximize its profit while advanced pricing features such as surge pricing are not considered. Let 𝑊(𝑁𝑖
𝑣) 
denote the waiting and pick-up time experienced by passengers opting for platform 𝑖, which depends on the 
number of idle vehicles 𝑁𝑖
𝑣 on the platform. Following Castillo et al. (2018), we assume that each platform 
implements a First-Come-First-Serve matching mechanism, and dispatches idle vehicle to a passenger 
immediately after he/she raises the travel request. In this case, the waiting time for matching is negligible, and 
𝑊(𝑁𝑖
𝑣) is dominated by the pick-up time. Let 𝑁𝑖 and 𝑁𝑖
𝑣 denote the fleet size and number of idle vehicles 
in equilibrium on platform 𝑖, respectively; let 𝑁 and 𝑁𝑣, respectively, denote the total fleet size and total 
number of idle vehicles in equilibrium in the market, i.e., 𝑁 = ∑ 𝑁𝑖𝑖  and 𝑁
𝑣 = ∑ 𝑁𝑖
𝑣
𝑖 . Let 𝑇 denote the 
average trip time and is assumed to be equal among all platforms. A user equilibrium is reached when 
passengers are indifferent with respect to all platforms, that is, the generalized costs (constituted of the 
monetary cost and time cost) in all ride-sourcing platforms are equal. In equilibrium, for each platform, the 
vehicle fleet size equals the sum of the numbers of vacant vehicles (𝑁𝑖
𝑣 + 𝑞𝑖𝑊(𝑁𝑖
𝑣)) and occupied vehicles 
(𝑞𝑖𝑇).2 Thus, we have the following equations:  
𝐵(𝑄) = 𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽(𝑇 + 𝑊(𝑁𝑖
𝑣)), ∀𝑖 (1) 
𝑁𝑖 = 𝑁𝑖
𝑣 + 𝑞𝑖(𝑇 + 𝑊(𝑁𝑖
𝑣)), ∀𝑖 (2) 
𝑄 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
(3) 
𝑁𝑣 = ∑ 𝑁𝑖
𝑣
𝐼
𝑖=1
(4) 
𝑁 = ∑ 𝑁𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
(5) 
                                                 
2 Vacant vehicles consist of idle vehicles that are available and those on the way to pick up the assigned passengers.  
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Let 𝑐 denote the average operating cost of a vehicle per time unit. In the market without platform-integration, 
each platform decides its trip fare 𝐹𝑖. The optimal profit of each platform at Nash Equilibrium (NE), denoted 
as 𝑃1
𝑛𝑒 , 𝑃2
𝑛𝑒 , ⋯ , 𝑃𝐼
𝑛𝑒, can be obtained using a set of nonnegative 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒 that solves the following optimization 
problem for each platform 𝑖 (hereinafter, variables with a superscript “𝑛𝑒” denote the optimal solutions at 
Nash equilibrium). 
max
𝑞𝑖≥0
𝑃𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖𝐹𝑖 − 𝑐𝑁𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖 (𝐵(𝑄) − 𝛽(𝑇 + 𝑊(𝑁𝑖
𝑣))) − 𝑐𝑁𝑖 (6) 
s.t. Eqs(1) − (3) 
Note that after substituting 𝐹𝑖 into the objective function by using the inverse demand function (1), searching 
the optimal passenger demand of each platform 𝑞𝑖  is equivalent to searching the optimal fare 𝐹𝑖 . The 
solutions (𝑞1
𝑛𝑒 , 𝑞2
𝑛𝑒 , ⋯ , 𝑞𝐼
𝑛𝑒) can be obtained using the first-order conditions:  
(𝐵(𝑄𝑛𝑒) + 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝐵′(𝑄𝑛𝑒) + 𝛽
𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑣
𝑑𝑞𝑖
|𝑞𝑖=𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒) 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒 = 0, ∀𝑖 (7) 
𝐵(𝑄𝑛𝑒) + 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝐵′(𝑄𝑛𝑒) + 𝛽
𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑣
𝑑𝑞𝑖
|𝑞𝑖=𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒 ≤ 0, ∀𝑖 (8) 
where 
𝑄𝑛𝑒 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒
𝐼
𝑖=1
, 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒 ≥ 0 (9) 
The social optimum scheme represents an ideal case where a social planner has full control of all the ride-
sourcing platforms and aims to maximize social welfare (denoted as 𝑆) by deciding the trip fares. Similarly, 
after substituting 𝐹𝑖 into the objective function below by using the inverse demand function in Eq(1), the 
unconstrained welfare-maximizing problem can be formulated as:3 
max
𝑞𝑖≥0
𝑆 = ∫ 𝐵(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑄
0
− ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝐵(𝑄)
𝐼
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝐹𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
− 𝑐𝑁 = ∫ 𝐵(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑄
0
− ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝛽(𝑇 + 𝑊(𝑁𝑖
𝑣))
𝐼
𝑖=1
− 𝑐𝑁 (10) 
                                                 
3 Since the profits for ride-sourcing platforms may be in deficit at unconstrained welfare-maximizing scheme, one may constrain 
that the profits are nonnegative or at least equal to a reservation value, which makes the social optimum sustainable. In this paper, 
we focus on the social optimum without profit constraint. 
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set Eqs(1) − (3) 
Let (𝑞1
𝑠𝑜 , 𝑞2
𝑠𝑜, ⋯ , 𝑞𝐼
𝑠𝑜) denote the optimal solution to (10) (hereinafter, superscript “𝑠𝑜” stands for social 
optimum) which can be obtained using the following first-order conditions:  
(𝐵(𝑄𝑠𝑜) + 𝛽
𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑣
𝑑𝑞𝑖
|𝑞𝑖=𝑞𝑖
𝑠𝑜) 𝑞𝑖
𝑠𝑜 = 0, ∀𝑖 (11) 
𝐵(𝑄𝑠𝑜) + 𝛽
𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑣
𝑑𝑞𝑖
|𝑞𝑖=𝑞𝑖
𝑠𝑜 ≤ 0, ∀𝑖 (12) 
where 
𝑄𝑠𝑜 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑠𝑜
𝐼
𝑖=1
, 𝑞𝑖
𝑠𝑜 ≥ 0 (13) 
Taking the first-order and second-order derivatives of both sides of Eq(2) with respect to 𝑞𝑖 yields: 
𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑣
𝑑𝑞𝑖
= −
𝑇 + 𝑊𝑖
1 + 𝑞𝑖𝑊𝑖
′ , ∀𝑖 (14) 
𝑑2𝑁𝑖
𝑣
𝑑𝑞𝑖
2 =
(𝑇 + 𝑊𝑖) (2𝑊𝑖
′ + 𝑞𝑖𝑊𝑖
′′ 𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑣
𝑑𝑞𝑖
)
(1 + 𝑞𝑖𝑊𝑖
′)2
, ∀𝑖 (15) 
where 𝑊𝑖, 𝑊𝑖
′, respectively, represent 𝑊(𝑁𝑖
𝑣) and 𝑑𝑊(𝑁𝑖
𝑣)/𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑣 for simplicity. 
Clearly, the signs of 𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑣/𝑑𝑞𝑖 and 𝑑
2𝑁𝑖
𝑣/𝑑𝑞𝑖
2 are uncertain. If 1 + 𝑞𝑖𝑊𝑖
′ < 0, the number of idle vehicles 
increases with demand, which is an inefficient market outcome termed as Wild Goose Chases (WGCs) 
(Castillo et al., 2018). In such case, the density of idle drivers is extremely low, which forces the platform to 
match passengers with distant drivers. Then drivers spend substantial time on the way to pick up passengers. 
It can be easily found from objective function (6) and the first-order condition (12) that the optimal solutions 
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at both Nash equilibrium and social optimum in the market without platform-integration do not locate in the 
WGC regions.4 
3.2. Market with platform-integration 
Next we consider an alternative scenario with an integrator that enables passengers to access all 𝐼 competing 
platforms simultaneously. Hereinafter, we use “~” to denote the counterparts of variables with platform-
integration. Realized passenger demand ?̃? are then divided into two groups: passengers who opt for the 
integrator (with an arrival rate of ?̃?1) and those who do not (with an arrival rate of ?̃?2), i.e., ?̃? = ?̃?1 + ?̃?2. 
Accordingly, for each platform, its realized demand ?̃?𝑖 consist of those from the integrator (denoted by ?̃?𝑖1) 
and those directly from its own platform (denoted as ?̃?𝑖2). Then ?̃?1 = ∑ ?̃?𝑖1
𝐼
𝑖=1  and ?̃?2 = ∑ ?̃?𝑖2
𝐼
𝑖=1 . Requests 
of passengers who order services via the integrator are assumed to be assigned to the ride-sourcing platforms 
depending on the availability of idle vehicles and corresponding pick-up distances without discrimination 
between platforms. In other words, when a passenger raises a request through the integrator, the integrator 
assigns the passenger to the nearest idle driver regardless of which platform the driver is affiliated to. Let ?̃?𝑣 
denote the total number of idle vehicles, and ?̃?𝑖
𝑣 the number of idle vehicles on platform 𝑖, then it should 
meet ?̃?𝑣 = ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝑣
𝑖 . The waiting and pickup time of passenger opting for the integrator is 𝑊(?̃?
𝑣), while that 
of platform 𝑖 is 𝑊(?̃?𝑖
𝑣). If platforms are free to re-optimize their trip fares after platform-integration is 
introduced, then a new Nash equilibrium may occur. Let ?̃?𝑖 and ?̃?𝑖 denote the trip fare and market share of 
platform 𝑖 in the integrator (i.e., ?̃?𝑖 = ?̃?𝑖1/?̃?1), respectively, then the expected trip fare in the integrator is 
∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 ?̃?𝑖 ; Let  ?̃?  denote the commission fee charged to the passengers by the integrator
5, while ?̃? ≥ 0 
indicates passengers pay fee to the integrator and ?̃? < 0 indicates the integrator offers some compensation to 
                                                 
4 Clearly, it should meet 𝛽𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑣/𝑑𝑞𝑖|𝑞𝑖=𝑞𝑖
𝑤𝑚 ≤ 0 due to the fact that 𝐵(𝑄𝑤𝑚) ≥ 0, which implies that social optimal solutions do 
not locate in the WGC regions. Given the optimal passenger demand 𝑞𝑖
𝑝𝑚
, it always satisfies the number of idle vehicles in the 
normal region is larger than its counterpart in the WGC region due to the inverted-U shape of 𝑓𝑖: 𝑁𝑖
𝑣 → 𝑞𝑖 (see Figure 6 in Appendix 
A for reference). Then, considering the objective function (6) at Nash equilibrium, the lower waiting time (or equivalently, the 
higher trip fare) in the normal region leads to a greater profit in the normal region than in the WGC region. Thus, the optimal 
solutions at Nash equilibrium are not located in the WGC region either. 
5 At present, the platform integrators such as Baidu and Gaode do not impose commission charge neither on passengers nor on 
individual platforms (but benefit indirectly from passengers’ patronage of their free services). Here, for generality, we suppose a 
commission charge (it can be positive, zero, or negative) is imposed on passengers rather the platform. 
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attract passengers. Then the monetary cost of passengers who opt for the integrator can be approximated by 
∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 ?̃?𝑖 + ?̃?. Let ?̃? denote the average trip time in the market with platform-integration and is assumed to 
be equal among all platforms. Then the generalized trip costs of passengers who opt for the integrator, denoted 
as ?̃?1 and passengers who opt for platform 𝑖, denoted as ?̃?2 in equilibrium, are given by, respectively: 
?̃?1 = ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
?̃?𝑖 + 𝛽 (?̃? + 𝑊(?̃?
𝑣)) + ?̃? (16) 
and 
?̃?2 =  ?̃?𝑖 + 𝛽 (?̃? + 𝑊(?̃?𝑖
𝑣)) (17) 
Suppose every passenger chooses the mode that minimizes its trip cost at equilibrium. Without loss of 
generality, let 𝑘 denote the index for the platform charging the highest trip fare, i.e., ?̃?𝑘 = max{?̃?𝑖} , ∀𝑖; let 
𝑗 denote the index for the platform charging the lowest trip fare, i.e., ?̃?𝑗 = min{?̃?𝑖} , ∀𝑖. Then, if ?̃? < ?̃?𝑗 − ?̃?𝑘, 
then ?̃?1 − ?̃?2 < ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 ?̃?𝑖 + ?̃? − ?̃?𝑗 < ?̃?𝑘 + ?̃?𝑗 − ?̃?𝑘 − ?̃?𝑗 = 0, which indicates the generalized trip cost of the 
passengers who opt for the integrator is always lower than that of passengers who do not, hence all passengers 
will choose the integrator. If ?̃? > 𝛽𝑊(?̃?𝑗
𝑣) , then ?̃?1 − ?̃?2 > ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 ?̃?𝑖 + 𝛽?̃? + ?̃? − ?̃?2 > ?̃?𝑗 + 𝛽 (?̃? +
𝑊(?̃?𝑗
𝑣)) − ?̃?2 = 0, which indicates the generalized trip cost of passengers who opt for the integrator is always 
higher than that of the passengers who do not, hence no passengers choose the integrator. Intuitively, if ?̃? is 
sufficiently small (e.g., below a threshold ?̃?1) such that ?̃?1 < ?̃?2 always holds, then all passengers choose the 
integrator; if ?̃? is sufficiently large (e.g., above a threshold ?̃?2) such that ?̃?1 > ?̃?2 always holds, then no 
passengers choose the integrator; if ?̃? is medium (e.g.,. between ?̃?1 and ?̃?2) with ?̃?1 = ?̃?2, passengers may 
be indifferent between the 𝐼 independent platforms and the integrator. Note that ?̃?1 and ?̃?2 depend on many 
factors, including exogenous variables (e.g., vehicle fleet size), platform decisions (i.e., trip fare), inverse 
demand function 𝐵(⋅) and waiting time 𝑊(⋅). It is possible that there exist no non-negative 𝜏1 such that all 
passengers choose the integrator when vehicle supply is sufficiently large or/and vehicle fleet sizes vary 
greatly among platforms. Based on discussion above, we then have the following equations: 
𝐵(?̃?) = min (?̃?1, ?̃?2) (18) 
?̃?𝑖1(?̃?2 − ?̃?1) ≥ 0, ∀𝑖 (19) 
?̃?𝑖2(?̃?1 − ?̃?2) ≥ 0, ∀𝑖 (20) 
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where constraints (19) and (20), respectively, indciate ?̃?𝑖1 = 0 if ?̃?1 > ?̃?2 (i.e., no passengers choose the 
integrator) and ?̃?𝑖2 = 0 if ?̃?2 > ?̃?1 (i.e., all passengers choose the integrator). In equilibrium, the number of 
rides (?̃?𝑖1, ?̃?𝑖2) that platform 𝑖 serves should also meet the following vehicle conservation constraint: 
𝑁𝑖 = ?̃?𝑖
𝑣 + ?̃?𝑖1 (?̃? + 𝑊(?̃?
𝑣)) + ?̃?𝑖2 (?̃? + 𝑊(?̃?𝑖
𝑣)) , ∀𝑖 (21) 
Under platform-integration, the supply (i.e., idle vehicles) of the competing platforms are managed in one 
matching pool without discrimination and the integrator assigns the passenger to the nearest idle driver. In 
that case, for each platform, its realized demand ?̃?𝑖1 for the integrator should be proportional to its number of 
idle ?̃?𝑖
𝑣, or equivalently, it should meet: 
?̃?𝑖1
?̃?𝑗1
=
?̃?𝑖
𝑣
?̃?𝑗
𝑣 , ∀𝑖, 𝑗 (22) 
For further analysis, we make the following two mild assumptions. 
Assumption 1. The average trip times on each platform with and without a platform integrator are equal, i.e., 
𝑇 = ?̃?. 
This assumption is realistic since vehicles on different platforms are operating on the same road network under 
the same traffic condition. 
Assumption 2. 
(a) The waiting and pick-up time function 𝑊(∙) is convex, strictly decreasing with the number of idle 
vehicles and continuously differentiable. 
(b) The inverse demand function 𝐵(∙) is convex, strictly decreasing with the realized passenger demand and 
continuously differentiable, and 𝑄 ∙ 𝐵(𝑄) is concave for 𝑄 > 0. 
(c) The total realized demand at both Nash equilibrium and social optimum is positive, i.e., 𝑄𝑛𝑒 > 0, 𝑄𝑠𝑜 >
0, ?̃?𝑛𝑒 > 0, ?̃?𝑠𝑜 > 0. 
Assumption 2-(a) says that the waiting and pick-up time monotonically decreases with the number of idle 
vehicles, but the declining slope (representing the marginal decrease caused by a unit increase of idle vehicles) 
becomes flatter as the number of idle vehicles increases. Assumption 2-(b) is required for the existence and 
uniqueness of the optimization solutions at either Nash equilibrium or social optimum, and is usually adopted 
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for demand function in revenue management. Assumption 2-(c) is to prevent unrealistic cases with 𝑄𝑝𝑚 =
0, 𝑄𝑤𝑚 = 0, ?̃?𝑝𝑚 = 0, ?̃?𝑤𝑚 = 0. 
If commission fee ?̃? charged by the integrator is lower than ?̃?1, passengers pay equal expected trip fare (given 
by ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 ?̃?𝑖) and bear equal waiting and pick-up time (given by 𝑊(?̃?
𝑣)) because all of them raise requests 
through the integrator. Then Eqs(18)-(22) reduce to: 
𝐵(?̃?) = ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 ?̃?𝑖 + 𝛽 (?̃? + 𝑊(?̃?
𝑣)) + ?̃? (23)  
𝑁𝑖 = ?̃?𝑖
𝑣 + ?̃?𝑖 (?̃? + 𝑊(?̃?
𝑣)) , ∀𝑖 (24) 
?̃?𝑣 = ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝑣
𝐼
𝑖=1
(25) 
?̃? = ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
(26) 
?̃?𝑖
?̃?𝑗
=
?̃?𝑖
𝑣
?̃?𝑗
𝑣 , ∀𝑖, 𝑗 (27) 
Using vehicle conservation constraint (24) as well as demand split rule for the integrator (27), we further 
obtain (?̃?𝑖
𝑣 + ?̃?𝑖 (?̃? + 𝑊(?̃?
𝑣)))/?̃?𝑖
𝑣 = (?̃?𝑗
𝑣 + ?̃?𝑗 (?̃? + 𝑊(?̃?
𝑣)))/?̃?𝑗
𝑣 , then 𝑁𝑖/?̃?𝑖
𝑣 = 𝑁𝑗/?̃?𝑗
𝑣 , that is, the 
number of idle vehicles on each platform is proportional to its corresponding vehicle fleet size, leading to the 
following relationship: 
?̃?𝑖
𝑣 =
𝑁𝑖
𝑁
?̃?𝑣, ∀𝑖 (28) 
If ?̃? lies between ?̃?1 and ?̃?2, passengers who opt for the integrator and those who opt for platform 𝑖 should 
have the same generalized trip costs in equilibrium. Then Eqs(16)-(18) are equivalent to the following 
equation: 
𝐵(?̃?) = ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
?̃?𝑖 + 𝛽 (?̃? + 𝑊(?̃?
𝑣)) + ?̃? = ?̃?𝑖 + 𝛽 (?̃? + 𝑊(?̃?𝑖
𝑣)) (29) 
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If ?̃? is above ?̃?2, no passengers choose the integrator due to its high commission charge, then the market is 
exactly equivalent to that without platform-integration, which has been analyzed in the previous section.  
In the market with platform-integration, each platform 𝑖 chooses ?̃?𝑖 to maximize its own profit (denoted as 
?̃?𝑖) at Nash equilibrium.6 Note that in the case of ?̃? < ?̃?1, all trip fare sets (?̃?1, ?̃?2, ⋯ , ?̃?𝐼) that do not satisfy 
?̃?𝑖 = ?̃?𝑗 = ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 ?̃?𝑖 , ∀𝑖, 𝑗 are not solutions at equilibrium, because the platform charging lower price has 
incentive to increase its price to reap greater profit. In other words, all platforms must set the equal trip fare 
(denoted as ?̃?) to achieve a stable market equilibrium. After substituting ?̃?𝑖 into the objective function below 
by using the inverse demand function (23), together with ?̃?𝑖 = ?̃?𝑗 = ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 ?̃?𝑖 , ∀𝑖, 𝑗, the Nash equilibrium 
(NE) in the case of ?̃? < ?̃?1 with platform-integration can be formulated as:7 
max
?̃?𝑖≥0
?̃?𝑖 = ?̃?𝑖?̃?𝑖 − 𝑐𝑁𝑖 = ?̃?𝑖 (𝐵(?̃?) − 𝛽 (?̃? + 𝑊(?̃?
𝑣)) − ?̃?) − 𝑐𝑁𝑖 (30) 
s.t. Eqs(23)-(28) 
Let (?̃?1
𝑛𝑒 , ?̃?2
𝑛𝑒 , ⋯ , ?̃?𝐼
𝑛𝑒) be a Nash equilibrium solution in the market with platform-integration, then the 
following first-order conditions must be satisfied: 
(𝐵(?̃?𝑛𝑒) + ?̃?𝑖
𝑝𝑚𝐵′(?̃?𝑛𝑒) +
𝑁𝑖
𝑁
𝛽
𝑑?̃?𝑣
𝑑?̃?𝑖
|?̃?𝑖=?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒 − ?̃?) ?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒 = 0, ∀𝑖 (31) 
𝐵(?̃?𝑛𝑒) + ?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝐵′(?̃?𝑛𝑒) +
𝑁𝑖
𝑁
𝛽
𝑑?̃?𝑣
𝑑?̃?𝑖
|?̃?𝑖=?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒 − ?̃? ≤ 0, ∀𝑖 (32) 
where 
                                                 
6 Here for generality, we suppose each individual platform is able to re-optimizes its fare after joining the integrator. In practice, 
platforms may keep their pricing strategies unchanged with the integrator, so we also compare the case with unchanged fare in the 
presence of platform-integration through numerical studies. 
7 It is worth mentioning that the profit-maximizing problem in the monopoly market can be mathematically formulated as max
𝑄>0
𝑃 =
𝑄𝐹 − 𝑐𝑁 = 𝑄 (𝐵(𝑄) − 𝛽(𝑇 + 𝑊(𝑁𝑣))) − 𝑐𝑁, which is exactly the same as maximizing sum of the profit of each platform in the 
market with platform-integration, defined in (30). Therefore, the solutions at monopoly optimum may be inconsistent with those 
obtained in the market with platform-integration at Nash equilibrium, 𝐼 ≥ 2. 
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?̃?𝑛𝑒 = ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒
𝐼
𝑖=1
, ?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒 ≥ 0 (33) 
Social welfare in the market with platform-integration (denoted as ?̃?) is defined to be the sum of consumer 
surplus and profits of all platforms and the integrator. In the case of ?̃? < ?̃?1, the objective function at social 
optimum can be mathematically written as: 
max
?̃?𝑖≥0
?̃? = ∫ 𝐵(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
?̃?
0
− ∑ ?̃?𝑖𝛽 (?̃? + 𝑊(?̃?
𝑣))
𝐼
𝑖=1
− 𝑐𝑁 (34) 
s.t. Eqs(23)-(28) 
Let (?̃?1
𝑠𝑜 , ?̃?2
𝑠𝑜, ⋯ , ?̃?𝐼
𝑠𝑜) denote the optimal solution to (34), then the following first-order conditions hold: 
(𝐵(?̃?𝑠𝑜) +
𝑁𝑖
𝑁
𝛽
𝑑?̃?𝑣
𝑑?̃?𝑖
|?̃?𝑖=?̃?𝑖
𝑠𝑜) ?̃?𝑖
𝑠𝑜 = 0, ∀𝑖 (35) 
𝐵(?̃?𝑠𝑜) +
𝑁𝑖
𝑁
𝛽
𝑑?̃?𝑣
𝑑?̃?𝑖
|?̃?𝑖=?̃?𝑖
𝑠𝑜 ≤ 0, ∀𝑖 (36) 
where 
?̃?𝑠𝑜 = ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝑠𝑜
𝐼
𝑖=1
, ?̃?𝑖
𝑠𝑜 ≥ 0 (37) 
From Eq(23), we can see that the optimal solution (?̃?1
𝑠𝑜 , ?̃?2
𝑠𝑜 , ⋯ , ?̃?𝐼
𝑠𝑜) is independent of the commission fee 
charged by the integrator, because trip fare and commission fee can be packaged as an auxiliary decision 
variable for the social planner. Taking the first-order and second-order derivatives of both sides of Eq(24) 
with respect to ?̃?𝑖 after substituting Eq(28) into Eq(24) yields: 
𝑑?̃?𝑣
𝑑?̃?𝑖
= −
?̃? + ?̃?
𝑁𝑖
𝑁 + ?̃?𝑖?̃?
′
, ∀𝑖 (38) 
𝑑2?̃?𝑣
𝑑?̃?𝑖
2 =
(?̃? + ?̃?) (2?̃?′ + ?̃?𝑖?̃?
′′ 𝑑?̃?
𝑣
𝑑?̃?𝑖
)
(
𝑁𝑖
𝑁 + ?̃?𝑖?̃?
′)
2 , ∀𝑖 (39) 
where ?̃?, ?̃?′, respectively, represent 𝑊(?̃?𝑣) and 𝑑𝑊(?̃?𝑣)/𝑑?̃?𝑣 for simplicity.  
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The sign of 𝑑?̃?𝑣/𝑑?̃?𝑖  and 𝑑
2?̃?𝑣/𝑑?̃?𝑖
2  are undetermined because the sign of the term 𝑁𝑖/𝑁 + ?̃?𝑖?̃?
′  is 
indeterminate. If 𝑁𝑖/𝑁 + ?̃?𝑖?̃?
′ > 0, the number of idle vehicles decreases with the passenger demand, which 
indicates the normal non-WGC regime. From objective function (30) and first-order condition (36), we can 
prove that the optimal solutions at both Nash equilibrium and social optimum in the market with platform-
integration are not in the WGC region. 
By summing up both sides of 𝐼 equations in Eq(24), we also obtain: 
𝑁 = ?̃?𝑣 + ?̃?(?̃? + ?̃?) (40) 
We then take the first order and second-order derivatives of both sides of Eq(40) with respect to ?̃?, which 
gives rise to:  
𝑑?̃?𝑣
𝑑?̃?
= −
?̃? + ?̃?
1 + ?̃??̃?′
(41) 
𝑑2?̃?𝑣
𝑑?̃?2
=
(?̃? + ?̃?) (2?̃?′ + ?̃??̃?′′
𝑑?̃?𝑣
𝑑?̃?
)
(1 + ?̃??̃?′)
2 (42)
 
It is worth noting that problem (34) can be reformulated with regard to ?̃? as follows: 
max
?̃?>0
𝑆 = ∫ 𝐵(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
?̃?
0
− ?̃?𝛽(?̃? + ?̃?) − 𝑐𝑁 (43) 
From constraint (40), we can see the maximum social welfare in the market with platform-integration is also 
independent of the number of platforms 𝐼.8 Noted that ?̃?𝑤𝑚 > 0 by Assumption 2-(c), then the first-order 
condition for problem (43) with an interior solution should satisfy: 
𝐵(?̃?𝑠𝑜) + 𝛽
𝑑?̃?𝑣
𝑑?̃?
|?̃?=?̃?𝑠𝑜 = 0 (44) 
                                                 
8 Based on this, when the supply capacity 𝑁 (i.e., vehicle fleet sizes) is fixed, the solutions in the monopoly market at social 
optimum exactly coincides with social optimal solutions in the market with platform-integration in the case of ?̃? < ?̃?1. 
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In the case that ?̃? lies between ?̃?1 and ?̃?2, each platform 𝑖’s optimal solutions at Nash equilibrium and social 
optimum can be obtained by solving the following problems, respectively: 
max
?̃?𝑖1,?̃?𝑖2≥0
?̃?𝑖 = (?̃?𝑖1 + ?̃?𝑖2)?̃?𝑖 − 𝑐𝑁𝑖 = (?̃?𝑖1 + ?̃?𝑖2) (𝐵(?̃?) − 𝛽 (?̃? + 𝑊(?̃?𝑖
𝑣))) − 𝑐𝑁𝑖 (45) 
s.t. Eqs(21),(22),(29) 
and 
max
?̃?𝑖1,?̃?𝑖2≥0
?̃? = ∫ 𝐵(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
?̃?
0
− ∑ ?̃?𝑖1𝛽 (?̃? + 𝑊(?̃?
𝑣))
𝐼
𝑖=1
− ∑ ?̃?𝑖2𝛽 (?̃? + 𝑊(?̃?𝑖
𝑣))
𝐼
𝑖=1
 − 𝑐𝑁 (46) 
s.t. Eqs(21),(22),(29) 
Due to the complexity of solving the above two optimization problems, we focus on the case in which all 
passengers opt for the integrator to facilitate our theoretical analysis, i.e., ?̃? < ?̃?1 . Unless otherwise 
specified, all passengers in the market with platform-integration are assumed to choose the integrator in the 
following theoretical derivations. Numerical studies will be conducted to analyze the general mixed market 
equilibrium with some passengers opting for the integrator and some for individual platforms. 
 
4. Evaluating performance of platform-integration  
In this section, we compare the optimal solutions between the markets with and without platform-integration 
at Nash equilibrium as well as social optimum. Our purpose is to evaluate the impacts of the platform-
integration, and to quantify the extent to which platform-integration influences realized passenger demand, 
vehicle utilization rate, platform profit, consumer surplus and social welfare. 
4.1. Impacts of vehicle fleet size with/without platform-integration at Nash equilibrium/social 
optimum 
Let 𝑈𝑖 and ?̃?𝑖, denote the vehicle utilization rate of platform 𝑖 in the markets without and with platform-
integration, measured by the fraction of occupied service time, respectively: 
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𝑈𝑖 =
𝑞𝑖𝑇𝑖
𝑁𝑖
, ∀𝑖 (47) 
and 
?̃?𝑖 =
(?̃?𝑖1 + ?̃?𝑖2)?̃?
𝑁𝑖
, ∀𝑖 (48) 
To see the influence of vehicle fleet size on the optimal solutions and system performance metrics, we present 
the following lemma. 
Lemma 1. With Assumptions 1 and 2, assuming ?̃? < ?̃?1, it holds: 
(a) If 𝑁𝑖 > 𝑁𝑗  and 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒 , 𝑞𝑗
𝑛𝑒 > 0, then we have 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒 > 𝑞𝑗
𝑛𝑒  and 𝑁𝑖
𝑣𝑛𝑒 > 𝑁𝑗
𝑣𝑛𝑒 . The same applies to the 
market with platform-integration. 
(b) If 𝑁𝑖 > 𝑁𝑗  and 𝑞𝑖
𝑠𝑜 , 𝑞𝑗
𝑠𝑜 > 0, then we have 𝑞𝑖
𝑠𝑜 > 𝑞𝑗
𝑠𝑜  and 𝑁𝑖
𝑣 𝑠𝑜 > 𝑁𝑗
𝑣 𝑠𝑜 . The same applies to the 
market with platform-integration. 
(c) Assuming 𝑁𝑣 ∙ 𝑊′(𝑁𝑣) is strictly increasing, if 𝑁𝑖 > 𝑁𝑗 and 𝑞𝑖
𝑠𝑜 , 𝑞𝑗
𝑠𝑜 > 0, then we have 𝑈𝑖
𝑠𝑜 > 𝑈𝑗
𝑠𝑜. 
(d) In the market with platform-integration, vehicles are utilized at the same degree, i.e., ?̃?𝑖 = ?̃?𝑗 , ∀𝑖, 𝑗. 
See Appendix A for the proof. 
Lemma 1 states that the platform with a larger fleet size has a greater market share at both Nash equilibrium 
and social optimum. In addition, the platform with a larger fleet size has a higher vehicle utilization rate at 
social optimum by assuming 𝑁𝑣 ∙ 𝑊′(𝑁𝑣) is a strictly increasing function, for example, 𝑊(𝑁𝑣) = 𝐴(𝑁𝑣)−𝜅, 
which is often used in the literature (Arnott, 1996; Li, et al., 2019).9 If 𝜅 =
1
2
, the average waiting and pick-
up time of passengers is inversely proportional to the square root of the number of idle vehicles. We should 
notice that the relation between vehicle fleet size and utilization rate is not monotonic at Nash equilibrium in 
the market without platform-integration, which will be further discussed in numerical examples. 
                                                 
9 𝐴 is an exogenous parameter that encapsulates the factors in the matching technology and depends on the area, vehicle fleet size 
and vehicle velocity, 𝜅 is a sensitivity parameter to the number of idle vehicles with 0 < 𝜅 ≤ 1. 
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4.2. Impacts of platform-integration at Nash equilibrium 
We firstly introduce the following lemma, which deals with the total realized demand at Nash equilibrium. 
Lemma 2. With Assumptions 1 and 2, assuming ?̃? < 𝜏̅, then it holds ?̃?𝑛𝑒 > 𝑄𝑛𝑒 for 𝐼 ≥ 2, where 𝜏̅ is given 
as follows: 
𝜏̅ = 𝐵(?̃?𝑛𝑒) +
1
𝐼
?̃?𝑛𝑒𝐵′(?̃?𝑛𝑒) − (𝐵(𝑄𝑛𝑒) +
1
𝐼
𝑄𝑛𝑒𝐵′(𝑄𝑛𝑒)) (49) 
See Appendix B for proof. 
The assumption that ?̃? < 𝜏̅ , where 𝜏̅ ≤ ?̃?1  measures the difference between the mean marginal total 
generalized costs perceived by passengers at Nash equilibrium in markets with and without platform-
integration. Lemma 2 implies that platform-integration can increase realized passenger demand at Nash 
equilibrium if its commission charge is reasonably low; specifically, platform-integration helps to attract more 
passengers due to reduced generalized costs. 
Let 𝑆𝑛𝑒 and ?̃?𝑛𝑒 denote the social welfare at Nash equilibrium in the market without and with platform-
integration, respectively, 
𝑆𝑛𝑒 = ∫ 𝐵(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑄𝑛𝑒
0
− ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝛽(𝑇𝑖 + 𝑊𝑖
𝑛𝑒)
𝐼
𝑖=1
− 𝑐𝑁 (50) 
?̃?𝑛𝑒 = ∫ 𝐵(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
?̃?𝑛𝑒
0
− ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝛽(?̃? + ?̃?𝑛𝑒)
𝐼
𝑖=1
− 𝑐𝑁 (51) 
Together with Lemma 2, we present the following theorem. 
Theorem 1. With Assumptions 1 and 2, assuming ?̃? < 𝜏̅ and 𝑞𝑖, ?̃?𝑖 > 0, then at Nash equilibrium, the social 
welfare in the market with platform-integration is h than that in the market without platform-integration, i.e., 
?̃?𝑛𝑒 > 𝑆𝑛𝑒 for 𝐼 ≥ 2. 
See Appendix C for proof. 
Theorem 1 states that platform-integration can improve social welfare at Nash equilibrium. Platform-
integration reduces the matching efficiency loss caused by market fragmentation. 
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However, the impact of platform-integration on the platform profit is uncertain. In the market with platform-
integration, there exists two opposite market forces affecting the profit: the positive force by increasing 
passenger demand and the negative one by reducing trip fare. Whether profit-maximizing platforms benefit 
from the platform-integration depends on the relative effects of the two opposite forces. 
When the supply capacity (i.e., vehicle fleet size) is small or/and there are fewer platforms, the system operates 
with a very large waiting and pick-up time, then the reduce of waiting and pick-up time due to platform-
integration is large due to the convexity of waiting time function, and then attracts more passengers to offset 
the negative effect of reduced trip fare, leading to a greater profit as well as greater social welfare. In that case, 
a win-win situation is achieved in which both the passengers and the ride-sourcing platforms are better off 
due to platform-integration. However, when the supply capacity increases to a certain degree or/and there are 
more platforms, though with an increase in passenger demand, the big decrease trip fare may lead to an 
unfavorable result with a shrinking profit for the platforms. In that case, the social welfare is still improved 
with the platform-integration since the increase in consumer surplus overwhelms the decrease in platform 
profit. Numerical experiments are conducted in Section 5 for further discussion. 
4.3. Impact of platform-integration at social optimum 
As for the comparison between the total realized demand in the markets with and without platform-integration 
at social optimum, we present the following lemma. 
Lemma 3. With Assumptions 1 and 2, assuming ?̃? < ?̃?1 and ?̃?
𝑣 𝑠𝑜 ≥ 𝑁𝑖
𝑣 𝑠𝑜, given a waiting time function 
𝑊(𝑁𝑣) = 𝐴(𝑁𝑣)−𝜅, then it holds ?̃?𝑠𝑜 > 𝑄𝑠𝑜 for 𝐼 ≥ 2. 
See Appendix D for the proof. 
The sufficient condition, ?̃?𝑣
𝑠𝑜
≥ 𝑁𝑖
𝑣 𝑠𝑜, indicates that at social optimum, the total number of idle vehicles in 
the market with platform-integration is greater than or equal to the number of idle vehicles of each platform 
in the market without platform-integration. This is a mild assumption that generally holds in actual operations. 
As aforementioned, the waiting time function 𝑊(𝑁𝑣) = 𝐴(𝑁𝑣)−𝜅  is widely used in the literature. From 
Lemma 2 and 3, we generally expect that the total realized demand in the market with platform-integration is 
greater than that in the market without platform-integration at both Nash equilibrium and social optimum, 
which implies that the market with platform-integration is more attractive to passengers.  
Let 𝑆𝑠𝑜  and ?̃?𝑠𝑜  denote the social welfare at social optimum in the markets without and with platform-
integration, respectively, 
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𝑆𝑠𝑜 = ∫ 𝐵(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑄𝑠𝑜
0
− ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑠𝑜𝛽(𝑇𝑖 + 𝑊𝑖
𝑠𝑜)
𝐼
𝑖=1
− 𝑐𝑁 (52) 
and 
?̃?𝑠𝑜 = ∫ 𝐵(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
?̃?𝑠𝑜
0
− ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝑠𝑜𝛽(?̃? + ?̃?𝑠𝑜)
𝐼
𝑖=1
− 𝑐𝑁 (53) 
Together with Lemma 3, we present the following theorem. 
Theorem 2. With Assumptions 1 and 2, assuming  ?̃? < ?̃?1, then at social optimum, the social welfare in the 
market with platform-integration is greater than or equal to that in the market without platform-integration, 
i.e., ?̃?𝑠𝑜 ≥ 𝑆𝑠𝑜. 
See Appendix E for proof. 
Together with Theorem 1, we find that platform-integration helps to improve social welfare at both Nash 
equilibrium and social optimum. 
 
5. Numerical studies 
In this section, we conduct several numerical experiments to illustrate the impacts of platform-integration on 
the optimal decision variable (i.e., trip fare), key endogenous variables (e.g., realized demand) and system 
performance metrics (e.g., vehicle utilization rate, platform profit, and social welfare). Specifically, we 
compare the following two ridesourcing markets with multiple platforms: (1) competitive market without 
platform-integration; and (2) competitive with platform-integration. In addition, the experiments demonstrate 
the extent to which the supply (in terms of the number of platforms 𝐼 and vehicle fleet size 𝑁𝑖) affects the 
performance of platform-integration. Further, we also evaluate the impacts of commission fee charged by the 
integrator in the general mixed market with some passengers choosing the integrator and others not. 
5.1. Experimental settings 
Consider the following negative exponential demand function: 
𝑄 = ?̅? exp(−𝛼𝐶) (54) 
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where 𝛼 > 0 is a cost sensitivity parameter, 𝐶 is the generalized travel cost given by 𝐹 + 𝛽(𝑇 + 𝑊), and ?̅? 
is the potential demand when 𝐶 = 0. 
Throughout the numerical studies, we assume the potential demand ?̅? = 1.0 × 105 (trip/h), cost sensitivity 
parameter 𝛼 = 0.013 (1/HKD), value of time 𝛽 = 120 (HKD/h), unit operating cost per vehicle 𝑐 = 50 
(HKD/h) and average trip time 𝑇 = 0.4 (h). The waiting time is assumed to be inversely proportional to the 
square root of the number of idle vehicles, i.e., 𝑊(𝑁𝑣) = 𝐴/√𝑁𝑣, where parameter 𝐴 is set to be 5 (h). Note 
that these parameter values are selected with partial reference to previous studies and for illustrative purposes 
only. In actual operations, one may calibrate the parameters using real data. 
5.2. Impacts of market fragmentation 
In this section, we investigate how market fragmentation (which is reflected by the number of platforms) 
affects the market performance metrics (e.g. platform profit, social welfare). For illustrative purposes, we 
assume vehicle fleet sizes are equal across all platforms, i.e., 𝑁𝑖 = 𝑁𝑗 , ∀𝑖, 𝑗; the total supply, namely, the sum 
of the number of vehicles of all platforms, is set to be a constant 2.0 × 104 (veh), i.e., 𝑁 = ∑ 𝑁𝑖𝑖 = 2.0 ×
104 (veh); commission fee charged by the integrator is set to be ?̃? = 0 (HKD). By increasing the number of 
platforms from 1 to 15, we demonstrate how the various market metrics changes with the degree of market 
fragmentation. The effects of such market fragmentation on the total realized demand, trip fare, total profit 
and social welfare are shown in Figure 1. The green solid line demonstrates how the market metrics change 
after the implementation of platform-integration, given that the trip fares are unchanged (namely, platforms 
do not reoptimize their trip fares after platform-integration is introduced). By contrast, the orange solid line 
indicates the trend of the market metrics with respect to the degree of market fragmentation, under the 
scenarios where the competing platforms reoptimize their trip fares in response to the implementation of 
platform-integration such that a new Nash equilibrium is formed.  
From Figure 1, we can see that the competitive market can be fully efficient regardless of platform-integration 
as the number of platforms increases to infinity. Namely, the optimal solutions and metrics (e.g., realized 
demand, profit, and social welfare) at Nash equilibrium of the markets with and without platform-integration 
converge to those at social optimum of the markets. As aforementioned, the social optimal solutions in the 
market with platform-integration is independent of the number of platforms (with the market fragmentation 
cost eliminated), shown as by the constant total demand, profit, and social welfare (see horizontal orange 
dashed lines in Figure 1). 
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Total realized demand: Figure 1-(a) shows that platform-integration helps increase the total realized demand 
at both Nash equilibrium and social optimum, and the increases become more significant with a large number 
of platforms. This indicates that, the more of platforms (or the higher the degree of market fragmentation), the 
more demand brought by platform-integration. Also, it is noted that the total demand in the market without 
platform-integration at Nash equilibrium initially increase then decrease with the number of platforms. This 
is because the increase of the number of platforms in the market without platform-integration brings two 
opposite effects. On one hand, it avoids the platforms from distorting the trip fares from the efficient level 
(dragging the market from monopoly optimum toward social optimum) by enhancing competitions; on the 
other hand, it increases the market fragmentation costs. The first effect helps to reduce the trip fare and attracts 
more passengers, while the second effect helps to increase passengers waiting time and thus discourage 
passengers from using ride-sourcing services. The implementation of platform-integration is able to maintain 
the first effect while eliminating the second negative effect; as a result, the total passenger demand of all 
platforms in the market with platform-integration approaches to the efficient level of passenger demand at 
social optimum, as the number of platforms increases to infinity. Compared with the green solid line and blue 
solid line in Figure 1-(a), we can see that, even without reoptimizing trip fares, platform-integration can help 
competing platforms attract more passengers when the number of platforms is small, but not as much as that 
can be achieved by reoptimizing the trip fares (see orange solid line). 
Trip fare: From Figure 1-(b), we can see that trip fares initially drop greatly with the number of platforms in 
the markets with and without platform-integration at Nash equilibrium, due to the competition among 
platforms. As the number of platforms continue increasing, platforms in the market with platform-integration 
keep reducing trip fares to stimulate a higher demand, while the platforms in the market without platform-
integration will even slightly increase trip fares. The latter is because, the matching frictions without platform-
integration become larger (i.e., the waiting time becomes larger and the marginal changes of waiting time with 
respect to a unit increase of supply becomes larger) when the market becomes more fragmented with more 
platforms. As a result, to offset the increased matching frictions, the for-profit platforms will choose to raise 
the trip fares to suppress the demand. This counter-intuitive phenomenon is also identified in Zha et al. (2017), 
who point out that one needs to explore the change of price elasticity of demand and that of matching frictions 
in order to determine whether competition will lower or raise the price level. By contrast, the platform-
integration will eliminate the market fragmentation loss, and thus the platforms will not increase the trip fares 
to suppress the demand.  
Total profit: As seen from Figure 1-(c), platform-integration may not necessarily improve total profit at Nash 
equilibrium. Platform-integration has two opposite effects on the total platform profit: (1) it increases total 
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demand by eliminating the market fragmentation cost and reducing the waiting time; (2) it intensifies the 
competition between platforms and induces them to reduce the trip fares. When there are fewer platforms, the 
first effect dominates the second effect, namely, platform-integration can greatly increase passenger demand 
while the platforms still set a comparable trip fare with the situation without platform-integration. As a result, 
platform-integration can increase platform profit as a whole. By contrast, when there are more platforms, the 
second effect dominates the first effect, namely, the reduction on trip fare caused by platform-integration is 
significantly large and can offset the increase of passenger demand. The reason is that, in the markets without 
platform-integration, the average pick-up time will surge in the situations with many platforms (and thus with 
severe market fragmentation cost). As aforementioned, at optimal pricing the platforms will set a trip fare to 
cover drivers’ average pick-up and travel time cost plus a monopoly mark-up, therefore, the average trip fare 
in the market without platform-integration will be higher than that in the market with platform integration 
(which eliminates the market fragmentation cost). Then we can conclude that platform-integration induce the 
platforms to set a lower trip fare than would the market without platform-integration, and consequently, reduce 
the profit of the platforms. Moreover, comparing blue solid line and green solid line in Figure 1-(c), we can 
see that, if the trip fares keep unchanged, profit in the market with platform-integration can be continuously 
enhanced (as given by the vertical gap) and such enhancement becomes more significant with the number of 
platforms. However, with reoptimized trip fares under a new Nash equilibrium, profit enhancement becomes 
less when the number of platforms is larger than 3. 
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(a). On total realized demand (b). On trip fare 
  
(c). On total profit (d). On social welfare 
Figure 1. Impacts of the number of platforms on total realized demand, trip fare, total profit and social welfare 
in the market with/without platform-integration. 
Social welfare: We can see from Figure 1-(d) that platform-integration helps to improve social welfare at 
both Nash equilibrium and social optimum, which is in accordance with our theoretical results in Theorem 1 
and 2, and such improvement increases with the number of platforms. This is because, platform-integration 
can not only maintain competitions and restrain distortion of trip fares, but also reduce the market 
fragmentation cost caused by competition. By comparing Figure 1-(d) and Figure 1-(a), we can observe that 
the curve of change in social welfare is similar to that of total realized demand (which directly dictates the 
consumer surplus). This is because, when the number of platforms is sufficiently large, the increase in 
consumer surplus significantly overwhelms the decrease in total profit, giving rise to continuously improved 
social welfare in the market with platform-integration. In the market without platform-integration, when the 
number of platforms is sufficiently large, social welfare cuts as a result of the decreases in both total realized 
demand and total profit. In addition, the market with platform-integration and re-optimization of trip fare can 
reach more improvement in social welfare than would the market without re-optimization of trip fares. 
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5.3. Impacts of vehicle fleet sizes 
This subsection verifies the theoretical findings in Sections 3, 4 and 5, and investigates the impacts of 
platform-integration on ride-sourcing platforms with different scales (reflected by their vehicle fleet sizes). 
We assume there are three platforms of different sizes (namely, platform 1, 2 and 3) in the ride-sourcing 
market, with vehicle fleet size of 𝑁1 = 500  (veh), 𝑁2 = 400  (veh), and 𝑁3 = 300  (veh), respectively; 
commission fee charged by the integrator is set to be ?̃? = 0 (HKD). We then scale up the vehicle fleet size of 
each platform by 10% in every instance. The corresponding results of such supply expansion are shown in 
Figures 2-4, in which the horizontal axis denotes total vehicle fleet size. 
Vehicle utilization rate: From Figure 2, we can see that vehicle utilization rates of all the three platforms 
firstly increase and then decrease with fleet sizes in markets with or without platform-integration.10 Intuitively, 
at the beginning an increase in vehicle fleet sizes spurs a significant increase in realized passenger demand 
(see Figure 3-(a)) by reducing passenger waiting time, which is large enough to increase the vehicle utilization; 
then the realized passenger demand grows slowly with vehicle fleet sizes, which leads to a waste of supply 
capacity and a lower vehicle utilization. We also find that the platform with the largest fleet size (i.e., platform 
1) has the greatest vehicle utilization rate when vehicle fleet size is not sufficiently large, but eventually falls 
behind in the market without platform-integration at Nash equilibrium (see Figure 2-(a)). By contrast, it always 
has the greatest vehicle utilization rate in the market without platform-integration at social optimum (see 
Figure 2-(b)), which is consistent with our theoretical results in Lemma 1. The reason is that, in the market 
without platform-integration, as a result of the increasing return to scale of matching, a platform with larger 
fleet size has a lower waiting time and attracts more passengers, and the resulting increase in passenger 
demand is sufficiently large to cause a higher utilization rate, but this marginal effect of increasing supply 
capacity on passenger demand diminishes more quickly than small platforms. Consequently, the increase in 
passenger demand fails to keep up with the increase in supply capacity, leading to a lower utilization rate for 
large platforms. It can also be observed that vehicle utilization rate in the market with platform-integration is 
larger than utilization rates of platforms of various sizes in the market without platform-integration. This 
implies that platform-integration can generally help the platforms increase vehicle utilization rate.  
                                                 
10 In the market with platform-integration, given current vehicle fleet sizes and ?̃? = 0, the curves of vehicle utilization rates of all 
platforms are identical because all passengers opt for the platform-integrator. 
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(a). At Nash equilibrium (b). At social optimum 
Figure 2. Impacts of vehicle fleet sizes on vehicle utilization rate in the market with/without platform-
integration at Nash equilibrium/social optimum. 
Realized demand: Next we demonstrate how realized demand changes after the implementation of 
integration of non-identical platforms. Figure 3-(a) and Figure 3-(b)  compare each platform’s realized 
demand between the markets with and without platform-integration, with re-optimized and unchanged trip 
fares, respectively. We can see from the figure that the realized demand initially increases rapidly with vehicle 
fleet sizes as a result of increasing return to scale of matching, and then grow slowly because the scale effect 
is fully exploited. Also, it is noted that platform-integration helps all three platforms of different sizes increase 
their passenger demands due to reduced passenger waiting time. By comparing the dashed lines in Figure 3-
(a) and Figure 3-(b), it can be seen that competitive re-optimization of trip fares after integration attract even 
more passengers. 
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(a) With trip fare re-optimized (b) With trip fare unchanged 
Figure 3. Impacts of vehicle fleet sizes on realized demand in the market with/without platform-integration. 
Profit: Figure 4-(a) and Figure 4-(b) compare each platform’s profit between the markets with and without 
platform-integration, with re-optimized and unchanged trip fares, respectively. We can see from the figure 
that the profits initially increase and then decrease with vehicle fleet sizes. When vehicle fleet sizes are small, 
an increase in supply capacity can significantly boost more demand by reducing passenger waiting time and 
thus bring a greater profit due to increasing returns to scale of matching function. By comparing the dashed 
lines (market with integration and re-optimized trip fares) with the solid lines (market without integration) in 
Figure 4-(a), we can see that platform-integration boosts profits of platforms (especially smaller platforms, 
e.g., platform 3) when vehicle fleet size is not very large; but it may hurt the profits of platforms (especially 
larger platforms, e.g., platform 1) with a further increase in fleet sizes, because matching friction is already 
small and the effect of platform-integration diminishes. As discussed before, whether a platform can gain 
more profit from platform-integration depends on the extent to which the impetus force from the increased 
passenger demand mitigates the resistance force from the decreased trip fare. By comparing the dashed lines 
in Figure 4-(b) (the market with platform-integration and unchanged trip fares) with the dashed lines in Figure 
4-(a) (the market with platform-integration and re-optimized trip fares), we find that larger platforms in the 
market with platform-integration are able to earn more profits in the short run when trip fares are unchanged. 
However, an iterative decision-process is needed to achieve a stable market equilibrium to evaluate the long-
term performance; in this case, the larger platform gains less and even loses profits after the platform-
integration.  
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(a). With trip fare re-optimized (b). With trip fare unchanged 
Figure 4. Impacts of vehicle fleet sizes on profit in the markets with/without platform-integration. 
5.4. Impacts of commission fee 
Note that in the numerical studies above, we evaluate the case of ?̃? ≤ ?̃?1 in which all passengers will choose 
the integrator in the market with platform-integration. In this section, we present numerical examples to 
investigate the impacts of commission fee ?̃?  charged by the integrator in the general mixed market 
equilibrium with some passengers choosing the integrator and others not, i.e., in the case of ?̃? ∈ [?̃?1, ?̃?2]. 
Assume there are three platforms (namely, platform 1, 2 and 3) in the ride-sourcing market, the trip fare of 
the three platforms is set to be 𝐹1 = 𝐹2 = 𝐹3 = 70  (HKD/trip), and trip fares remain unchanged after 
platform-integration is implemented, i.e., ?̃?1 = ?̃?2 = ?̃?3 = 70  (HKD/trip). Let (𝑁1, 𝑁2, 𝑁3)  denote the 
supply capacity of the three platforms. We conduct numerical experiments under three different supply, 
namely, (2000, 2000, 2000), (3000, 3000, 3000), (3000, 2000, 1000) and (4000, 3000, 2000), in units 
of veh. It is worth nothing that all other parameters are presented in Section 5.1.  
Figure 5 shows how total realized demand change with the increase of commission fee in the general mixed 
market equilibrium, under different supply capacities. The cross at the left (right) end of each curve indicates 
the critical lower (or upper) threshold of the commission, i.e., ?̃?1 (or ?̃?2), below (or beyond) which all (or no) 
passengers would choose the integrator. In other words, the general mixed market equilibrium can be reached 
within a range of ?̃? ∈ [?̃?1, ?̃?2]. By comparing orange solid line (red solid line) with blue solid line (green solid 
line), it is worth noting that the lower and upper bounds of such range generally decrease with vehicle fleet 
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size. This is due to the fact that matching friction is smaller when fleet size is larger given a fixed potential 
demand, and thus the effect of platform-integration (reduction of market fragmentation) becomes marginal, 
as a result, the integrator must lower the commission charge in order to retain patronage. In addition, by 
comparing orange solid line (blue solid) with red solid line (green solid line), we can see that the lower and 
upper bounds of such range in the case that platforms are of identical size are smaller than the bounds in the 
case that platforms are of different size, which implies that, when the ridesourcing market has heterogeneous 
platforms in terms of vehicle capacity, the platform-integration could better attract passengers so that the 
integrator can afford to increase commission fee to maintain a higher realized demand and achieve a greater 
profit. 
 
Figure 5. Impacts of commission fee on realized demand given fixed trip fares under different supply 
capacities. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate a novel business mode in the ride-sourcing market, i.e., the integration of multiple 
ride-sourcing platforms into one integrator; the integration is referred to as third-party platform-integration. 
We propose mathematical models to describe the ride-sourcing market with multiple competing platforms, 
and compare vehicle utilization rate, realized demand, profit and social welfare in two markets scenarios: (1) 
competitive market without platform-integration; and (2) competitive market with platform-integration. The 
major findings of the study are summarized below. 
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First, we prove that platform-integration can increase total realized demand and social welfare at both Nash 
equilibrium and social optimum. Second, we find that platform-integration in general can not only maintain 
competition and restrain platforms’ market power of distorting trip fares, but also reduce the market 
fragmentation cost caused by competition, leading to the greater social welfare. Third, platform-integration 
may not increase total profit when the market is too fragmented (i.e., when the number of platforms is large), 
since the platforms may face cut-throat competition and have to set an extremely low trip fare in the absence 
of market fragmentation cost (that is eliminated by platform-integration). By contrast, in the market without 
platform-integration, the presence of the market fragmentation cost will induce the platforms to raise the trip 
fares to suppress the demand, leading to a relatively high platform profit. Fourth, we find that a win-win 
situation where both passengers and platforms are better off can be achieved when the supply capacity is not 
too large. By contrast, platform-integration can still generate greater profits for smaller platforms but may 
lower profits for larger platforms, when the supply capacity is relatively large. In addition, investigation of 
platform-integration in general mixed market equilibrium (with some passengers opting for the integrator and 
others not) is analytically intractable; extensive numerical studies are executed to evaluate its equilibrium. We 
find that a general mixed market equilibrium can be reached within a certain range of commission fee, and 
the integrator can afford to set a relatively higher commission fee to maintain a higher realized demand and 
achieve a greater profit when the total supply level is low or/and platforms are heterogeneous in terms of 
vehicle capacity.  
Our study opens avenues that merit further exploration. To name a few, (1) platform-integration with elastic 
supply and its impact on the platform profit, consumer surplus, provider (driver) surplus and social welfare; 
(2) partial platform-integration where passengers have freedom to choose a subset of platforms that offer 
differentiated ride-sourcing services through the integrator; (3) platform and service mode choice of 
heterogeneous passengers with different values of time; (4) market fragmentation cost caused by 
heterogeneous services (e.g., normal ride, luxury ride, and ride-pooling) and the appropriate cross-service 
integration mechanisms (such as service upgrading) to reduce and even eliminate the cost; (5) mobility-as-a-
service (MaaS) with seamless integration of various on-demand services, including ride-sourcing, bike-
sharing and on-demand bus services.  
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1. 
Define 
𝑓𝑖(𝑥) =
𝑁𝑖 − 𝑥
𝑇 + 𝑊(𝑥)
, 𝑥 > 0 (55) 
where 𝑓𝑖(𝑥) and 𝑥, respectively, denote 𝑖
𝑡ℎ platform 𝑖’ realized passenger demand 𝑞𝑖 and its corresponding 
number of idle vehicles 𝑁𝑖
𝑣  in the market without platform-integration. That is, 𝑓𝑖(𝑁𝑖
𝑣) = 𝑞𝑖  and 
𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑣/𝑑𝑞𝑖|𝑞𝑖=𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒 = 1/𝑓𝑖
′(𝑁𝑖
𝑣𝑛𝑒). 
First-order and second-order derivative with respect 𝑥 
𝑓𝑖
′(𝑥) = −
1 + 𝑓𝑖(𝑥)𝑊
′(𝑥)
𝑇 + 𝑊(𝑥)
(56) 
𝑓𝑖
′′(𝑥) =
2𝑊′(𝑥)(1 + 𝑓𝑖(𝑥)𝑊
′(𝑥)) − (𝑁𝑖 − 𝑥)𝑊
′′(𝑥)
(𝑇 + 𝑊(𝑥))
2  
In the normal region, we have 𝑓𝑖
′(𝑥) < 0 and 𝑓𝑖
′′(𝑥) < 0. Clearly, if 𝑁𝑖 > 𝑁𝑗, we have 𝑓𝑖(𝑥) > 𝑓𝑗(𝑥) and 
𝑓𝑖
′(𝑥) > 𝑓𝑗
′(𝑥). Assuming 𝑓𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑓𝑗
′(𝑥𝑗) = 0, we obtain 𝑓𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑓𝑗
′(𝑥𝑗) < 𝑓𝑖
′(𝑥𝑗). Based on the fact that 
𝑓𝑖
′′(𝑥) < 0, we have 𝑥𝑖 > 𝑥𝑗 , which can be illustrated in Figure . 
Define 
𝑔𝑖(𝑢) =
1 − 𝑢
𝑇 + 𝑊(𝑁𝑖𝑢)
𝑇, 𝑢 > 0 (57) 
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where 𝑔𝑖(𝑢) and 𝑢 , respectively, denote the platform 𝑖 ’s vehicle utilization rate (𝑞𝑖𝑇/𝑁𝑖 ) and ratio of 
idleness (𝑁𝑖
𝑣/𝑁𝑖), the latter is defined as the proportion of idle vehicles on the platform. 
First-order and second-order derivative with respect 𝑢 
𝑔𝑖
′(𝑢) = −
1 + 𝑓𝑖(𝑁𝑖𝑢)𝑊
′(𝑁𝑖𝑢)
𝑇 + 𝑊(𝑁𝑖𝑢)
𝑇 (58) 
𝑔𝑖
′′(𝑢) =
2𝑁𝑖𝑊
′(𝑁𝑖𝑢)(1 + 𝑓𝑖(𝑁𝑖𝑢)𝑊
′(𝑁𝑖𝑢)) − 𝑁𝑖
2(1 − 𝑢)𝑊′′(𝑁𝑖𝑢)
(𝑇 + 𝑊(𝑁𝑖𝑢))
2 𝑇 
Assuming 𝑢 = 𝑥/𝑁𝑖, 0 < 𝑢 < 1, clearly, we have 𝑔𝑖
′(𝑢) = 𝑓𝑖
′(𝑥)𝑇, thus 𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑣/𝑑𝑞𝑖|𝑞𝑖=𝑞𝑖
𝑝𝑚 = 𝑇/𝑔𝑖
′(𝑢𝑖
𝑝𝑚). In 
the normal region, it holds 𝑔𝑖
′(𝑢) < 0 and 𝑔𝑖
′′(𝑢) < 0. Define 𝐻𝑖(𝑢) = 1 + 𝑓𝑖(𝑁𝑖𝑢)𝑤′(𝑁𝑖𝑢). In the normal 
region, we have 𝐻𝑖
′(𝑢) = 𝑁𝑖𝑓𝑖
′(𝑁𝑖𝑢)𝑤
′(𝑁𝑖𝑢) + 𝑁𝑖𝑓𝑖(𝑁𝑖𝑢)𝑤
"(𝑁𝑖𝑢) > 0 . Therefore, 𝐻𝑖(𝑢)  is a strictly 
increasing function.  
If 𝑁𝑖 > 𝑁𝑗 , we have 𝑥𝑖 > 𝑥𝑗 . Since 𝑥𝑤′(𝑥) is a strictly increasing function and 𝑤′(𝑥) < 0, we further obtain 
0 > 𝑢𝑁𝑖𝑤
′(𝑢𝑁𝑖) > 𝑢𝑁𝑗𝑤
′(𝑢𝑁𝑗)  and 0 < 𝑤(𝑢𝑁𝑖) < 𝑤(𝑢𝑁𝑗) , leading to 𝑁𝑖𝑤
′(𝑢𝑁𝑖) (𝑇 + 𝑤(𝑢𝑁𝑗)) >
𝑁𝑗𝑤
′(𝑢𝑁𝑗)(𝑇 + 𝑤(𝑢𝑁𝑖)). Then, we can get 
𝑁𝑖(1 − 𝑢)𝑤
′(𝑢𝑁𝑖)
(𝑇 + 𝑤(𝑢𝑁𝑖))
>
𝑁𝑗(1 − 𝑢)𝑤
′(𝑢𝑁𝑗)
(𝑇 + 𝑤(𝑢𝑁𝑗))
 
The inequality indicates that if 𝑁𝑖 > 𝑁𝑗  we have 𝐻𝑖(𝑢) > 𝐻𝑗(𝑢). Assuming 𝐻𝑖(𝑢𝑖) = 0 and 𝐻𝑗(𝑢𝑗) = 0, 
we have 𝐻𝑖(𝑢𝑖) = 𝐻𝑗(𝑢𝑗) < 𝐻𝑖(𝑢𝑗). Based on the fact that 𝐻𝑖(𝑢) is an increasing function, we have 𝑢𝑖 <
𝑢𝑗 . Since 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖/𝑁𝑖, from 𝑥𝑖 > 𝑥𝑗 , we can also get 𝑢𝑖𝑁𝑖 > 𝑢𝑗𝑁𝑗. 
Without platform-integration: 
Lemma 1-(a). If 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒 > 0 and 𝑞𝑗
𝑛𝑒 > 0, from first-order condition (8), we have 
𝐵(𝑄𝑛𝑒) + 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝐵′(𝑄𝑛𝑒) = −𝛽
𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑣
𝑑𝑞𝑖
|𝑞𝑖=𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒 (59) 
𝐵(𝑄𝑛𝑒) + 𝑞𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝐵′(𝑄𝑛𝑒) = −𝛽
𝑑𝑁𝑗
𝑣
𝑑𝑞𝑗
|𝑞𝑗=𝑞𝑗
𝑛𝑒 (60) 
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As mentioned, we have 𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑣/𝑑𝑞𝑖 < 0 and 𝑑
2𝑁𝑖
𝑣/𝑑𝑞𝑖
2 < 0 for ∀𝑖 in the normal region, then the impact of 
fleet size can be illustrated in Figure -(a). If 𝑁𝑖 > 𝑁𝑗 , 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒 > 0  and 𝑞𝑗
𝑛𝑒 > 0 , let 𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑣/𝑑𝑞𝑖|𝑞𝑖=𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒∗ =
𝑑𝑁𝑗
𝑣/𝑑𝑞𝑗|𝑞𝑗=𝑞𝑗
𝑛𝑒, then we have 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒∗ > 𝑞𝑗
𝑛𝑒. However, due to the fact that 𝐵′(𝑄𝑛𝑒) < 0, to satisfy Eq (59) 
and (60), it holds 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒∗ > 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒 > 𝑞𝑗
𝑛𝑒 . From Figure -(a), we also obtain 𝑁𝑖
𝑣𝑛𝑒 > 𝑁𝑗
𝑣𝑛𝑒 . By substituting 
𝑈𝑖
𝑛𝑒 = 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝑇/𝑁𝑖  and 𝑈𝑗
𝑛𝑒 = 𝑞𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑇/𝑁𝑗   into Eq (59) and (60), respectively, we get 
𝐵(𝑄𝑛𝑒) +
𝑈𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝑁𝑖
𝑇
𝐵′(𝑄𝑛𝑒) = −𝛽
𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑣
𝑑𝑞𝑖
|𝑞𝑖=𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒 (61) 
𝐵(𝑄𝑛𝑒) +
𝑈𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑁𝑗
𝑇
𝐵′(𝑄𝑛𝑒) = −𝛽
𝑑𝑁𝑗
𝑣
𝑑𝑞𝑗
|𝑞𝑗=𝑞𝑗
𝑛𝑒 (62) 
However, the relation between 𝑈𝑖
𝑛𝑒 and 𝑈𝑗
𝑛𝑒 is uncertain. In Figure -(b), 𝑢𝑖
𝑛𝑒1 denotes the case that 𝑈𝑖
𝑛𝑒 >
𝑈𝑗
𝑛𝑒, while 𝑢𝑖
𝑛𝑒2 denotes the case that 𝑈𝑖
𝑛𝑒 < 𝑈𝑗
𝑛𝑒.  
Lemma 1-(b). If 𝑞𝑖
𝑠𝑜 > 0 and 𝑞𝑗
𝑠𝑜 > 0, from first-order condition (12), we have 
𝐵(𝑄𝑠𝑜) = −𝛽
𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑣
𝑑𝑞𝑖
|𝑞𝑖=𝑞𝑖
𝑠𝑜 
𝐵(𝑄𝑠𝑜) = −𝛽
𝑑𝑁𝑗
𝑣
𝑑𝑞𝑗
|𝑞𝑗=𝑞𝑗
𝑠𝑜 
Similarly, the impact of fleet size at social optimum can be shown in Figure -(c) and (d). That is, if 𝑁𝑖 > 𝑁𝑗, 
𝑞𝑖
𝑠𝑜 > 0 and 𝑞𝑗
𝑠𝑜 > 0, we have 𝑞𝑖
𝑠𝑜 > 𝑞𝑗
𝑠𝑜, 𝑁𝑖
𝑣 𝑠𝑜 > 𝑁𝑖
𝑣 𝑠𝑜 and 𝑈𝑖
𝑠𝑜 > 𝑈𝑗
𝑠𝑜. 
With platform-integration: 
If all passengers opt for the integrator in the market with platform-integration, we have ?̃?𝑖
𝑣/?̃?𝑖 = ?̃?𝑗
𝑣/?̃?𝑗 . 
Using the vehicle conservation constraint (24) , we have (𝑁𝑖 − ?̃?𝑖 (?̃? + 𝑊(?̃?
𝑣)))/?̃?𝑖 = (𝑁𝑗 − ?̃?𝑗 (?̃? +
𝑊(?̃?𝑣)))/?̃?𝑗 , leading to ?̃?𝑖?̃?/𝑁𝑖 = ?̃?𝑗?̃?/𝑁𝑗 , i.e., ?̃?𝑖 = ?̃?𝑗 . From ?̃?𝑖?̃?/𝑁𝑖 = ?̃?𝑗?̃?/𝑁𝑗 , we can obtain that 
passenger demand for each platform from the integrator is proportional to its corresponding vehicle fleet size, 
i.e., ?̃?𝑖 =
𝑁𝑖
𝑁
?̃?. Clearly, if 𝑁𝑖 > 𝑁𝑗, we have ?̃?𝑖 > ?̃?𝑗. 
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(a). On 𝑞𝑖 and 𝑁𝑖
𝑣 at Nash equilibrium (b). On 𝑈𝑖 at Nash equilibrium 
  
(c). On 𝑞𝑖 and 𝑁𝑖
𝑣 at social optimum (d). On 𝑈𝑖 at social optimum 
Figure 6. Impacts of vehicle fleet size at Nash equilibrium/social optimum. 
 
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 2. 
Proof. Clearly, ?̃?𝑛𝑒 = 𝑄𝑛𝑒 if 𝐼 = 1. Suppose 𝑞𝑘
𝑛𝑒 ≥
1
𝐼
𝑄𝑛𝑒 > 0, ?̃?𝑗
𝑛𝑒 ≤
1
𝐼
?̃?𝑛𝑒, then we have 
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𝐵(𝑄𝑛𝑒) +
1
𝐼
𝑄𝑛𝑒𝐵′(𝑄𝑛𝑒) ≥ 𝐵(𝑄𝑛𝑒) + 𝑞𝑘
𝑛𝑒𝐵′(𝑄𝑛𝑒) 
𝐵(?̃?𝑛𝑒) +
1
𝐼
?̃?𝑛𝑒𝐵′(?̃?𝑛𝑒) ≤ 𝐵(?̃?𝑛𝑒) + ?̃?𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝐵′(?̃?𝑛𝑒) 
If ∀𝑘, 𝑗, 𝑞𝑘
𝑛𝑒 ≥
1
𝐼
𝑄𝑛𝑒 > 0, ?̃?𝑗
𝑛𝑒 ≤
1
𝐼
?̃?𝑛𝑒, it meets 𝑞𝑘
𝑛𝑒 < ?̃?𝑗
𝑛𝑒, clearly we have 𝑄𝑛𝑒 < ?̃?𝑛𝑒. Otherwise, ∃𝑘, 𝑗, 
such that 𝑞𝑘
𝑛𝑒 ≥ ?̃?𝑗
𝑛𝑒, then we have 
𝐵(𝑄𝑛𝑒) + 𝑞𝑘
𝑛𝑒𝐵′(𝑄𝑛𝑒) = −𝛽
𝑑𝑁𝑘
𝑣
𝑑𝑞𝑘
|𝑞𝑘=𝑞𝑘
𝑛𝑒  
≥ −𝛽
𝑑𝑁𝑘
𝑣
𝑑𝑞𝑘
|𝑞𝑘=?̃?𝑗
𝑛𝑒  
> −
𝑁𝑗
𝑁
𝛽
𝑑?̃?𝑣
𝑑?̃?𝑗
|?̃?𝑗=?̃?𝑗
𝑛𝑒 (63) 
≥ 𝐵(?̃?𝑛𝑒) + ?̃?𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝐵′(?̃?𝑛𝑒) − ?̃? 
where from top to bottom, follows from first-order conditions (7)  and (8) , from 𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑣/𝑑𝑞𝑖 < 0  and 
𝑑2𝑁𝑖
𝑣/𝑑𝑞𝑖
2 < 0 for ∀𝑖 in the normal region, from the subsequent proof below, and from first-order condition 
(32). 
Combing the above results yields 
𝐵(𝑄𝑛𝑒) +
1
𝐼
𝑄𝑛𝑒𝐵′(𝑄𝑛𝑒) > 𝐵(?̃?𝑛𝑒) +
1
𝐼
?̃?𝑛𝑒𝐵′(?̃?𝑛𝑒) − ?̃? 
Assuming ?̇̃? = 𝐵(?̃?𝑛𝑒) +
1
𝐼
?̃?𝑛𝑒𝐵′(?̃?𝑛𝑒) − (𝐵(𝑄𝑛𝑒) +
1
𝐼
𝑄𝑛𝑒𝐵′(𝑄𝑛𝑒)), then if ?̃? < ?̇̃?, we have 
𝐵(𝑄𝑛𝑒) +
1
𝐼
𝑄𝑛𝑒𝐵′(𝑄𝑛𝑒) > 𝐵(?̃?𝑛𝑒) +
1
𝐼
?̃?𝑛𝑒𝐵′(?̃?𝑛𝑒) 
Based on Assumption 2-(b) that 𝑄𝐵(𝑄) is concave, we can derive that 𝐵(𝑄) +
1
𝐼
𝑄𝐵′(𝑄) is decreasing. 
Then we obtain 𝑄𝑛𝑒 < ?̃?𝑛𝑒 , 𝐼 ≥ 2, with the assumption that ?̃? < ?̇̃?. The proof is completed. 
 
The following part proves the result in (63). 
Define 
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𝑓𝑖(𝑥) =
𝑁𝑖 −
𝑁𝑖
𝑁 𝑥
?̃? + 𝑊(𝑥)
, 𝑥 > 0 (64) 
First-order and second-order derivative with respect 𝑥 
𝑓𝑖
′(𝑥) = −
𝑁𝑖
𝑁 + 𝑓𝑖
(𝑥)𝑊′(𝑥)
?̃? + 𝑊(𝑥)
(65) 
𝑓𝑖
′′(𝑥) =
2𝑊′(𝑥) (1 + 𝑓𝑖(𝑥)𝑊
′(𝑥)) − (𝑁𝑖 −
𝑁𝑖
𝑁 𝑥) 𝑊
′′(𝑥)
(?̃? + 𝑊(𝑥))
2  
In the normal region, we have 𝑓𝑖
′(𝑥) < 0  and 𝑓𝑖
′′(𝑥) < 0 . In this study, 𝑥  and 𝑓𝑖(𝑥) denote total idle 
vehicles ?̃?𝑣  and platform 𝑖’ demand ?̃?𝑖  in the market with platform-integration, respectively. Assuming 
𝑓𝑘(𝑥𝑘) = 𝑓𝑗(𝑥𝑗) = ?̃?𝑗
𝑛𝑒 , then we have 𝑥𝑗 > 𝑥𝑘, 𝐼 ≥ 2. Based the definitions, comparing 𝑑𝑁𝑘
𝑣/𝑑𝑞𝑘|𝑞𝑘=?̃?𝑗
𝑛𝑒 
and 
𝑁𝑗
𝑁
𝑑?̃?𝑣/𝑑?̃?𝑗|?̃?𝑗=?̃?𝑗
𝑛𝑒  is equivalent to compare 𝑓𝑘
′(𝑥𝑘) and 
𝑁
𝑁𝑗
𝑓𝑗
′(𝑥𝑗), that is, if 𝑓𝑘
′(𝑥𝑘) >
𝑁
𝑁𝑗
𝑓𝑗
′(𝑥𝑗), we 
have 𝑑𝑁𝑘
𝑣/𝑑𝑞𝑘|𝑞𝑘=?̃?𝑗
𝑛𝑒 <
𝑁𝑗
𝑁
𝑑?̃?𝑣/𝑑?̃?𝑗|?̃?𝑗=?̃?𝑗
𝑛𝑒 . 
Using the definition of 𝑓𝑖
′(𝑥) and 𝑓𝑘
′(𝑥𝑘), we have 
𝑁
𝑁𝑗
𝑓𝑗
′(𝑥𝑗) = −
1 +
𝑁
𝑁𝑗
𝑓𝑗(𝑥𝑗)𝑊
′(𝑥𝑗)
?̃? + 𝑊(𝑥𝑗)
 
> −
1 + 𝑓𝑗(𝑥𝑗)𝑊
′(𝑥𝑗)
?̃? + 𝑊(𝑥𝑗)
 
> −
1 + 𝑓𝑗(𝑥𝑗)𝑊
′(𝑥𝑘)
?̃? + 𝑊(𝑥𝑘)
 
= −
1 + 𝑓𝑘(𝑥𝑘)𝑊
′(𝑥𝑘)
?̃? + 𝑊(𝑥𝑘)
 
= 𝑓𝑘
′(𝑥𝑘) 
where from top to bottom, follows from the definition (56) of 𝑓𝑗
′(𝑥𝑗), from the fact that 𝑁/𝑁𝑗 ≥ 1, from the 
fact that 𝑥𝑘 > 𝑥𝑗, from the fact that 𝑓𝑘(𝑥𝑘) = 𝑓𝑗(𝑥𝑗), and from the definition (65) of 𝑓𝑘
′(𝑥𝑘). 
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Thus, we have 
𝑁
𝑁𝑗
𝑓𝑗
′(𝑥𝑗) < 𝑓𝑘
′(𝑥𝑘), which leads to 𝑑𝑁𝑘
𝑣/𝑑𝑞𝑘|𝑞𝑘=?̃?𝑗
𝑛𝑒 <
𝑁𝑗
𝑁
𝑑?̃?𝑣/𝑑?̃?𝑗|?̃?𝑗=?̃?𝑗
𝑛𝑒 , and we prove 
Eq(63). 
 
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 1. 
Based on the social welfare at Nash equilibrium in the market with platform-integration given in Eq(51) and 
without platform-integration given in Eq(50), we obtain 
?̃?𝑛𝑒 − 𝑆𝑛𝑒 = ∫ 𝐵(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
?̃?𝑛𝑒
𝑄𝑛𝑒
− (∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝛽(?̃? + ?̃?𝑛𝑒)
𝐼
𝑖=1
− ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝛽(𝑇 + 𝑊𝑖
𝑛𝑒)
𝐼
𝑖=1
) 
Substituting vehicle conservation constrains (2) and (24) into the above equation yields 
?̃?𝑛𝑒 − 𝑆𝑛𝑒 = ∫ 𝐵(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
?̃?𝑛𝑒
𝑄𝑛𝑒
+ ∑ 𝛽(
𝑁𝑖
𝑁
?̃?𝑣
𝑛𝑒
− 𝑁𝑖
𝑣𝑛𝑒)
𝐼
𝑖=1
 
Because 𝐵(𝑥) is convex and strictly decreasing, we have 
∫ 𝐵(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
?̃?𝑛𝑒
𝑄𝑛𝑒
≥ (?̃?𝑛𝑒 − 𝑄𝑛𝑒)𝐵(?̃?𝑛𝑒) 
Based on the definition of 𝑓𝑖(𝑥) (64)  and 𝑓𝑖(𝑥) (55), we have ?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒 = 𝑓𝑖(?̃?
𝑣𝑛𝑒) and 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒 = 𝑓𝑖(𝑁𝑖
𝑣𝑛𝑒). 
Suppose 𝑞𝑖
′𝑛𝑒 = 𝑓𝑖 (
𝑁
𝑁𝑖
𝑁𝑖
𝑣𝑛𝑒), then it holds 𝑞𝑖
′𝑛𝑒 ≥ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒. 
Because we have 𝑑?̃?𝑣/𝑑?̃?𝑖 < 0 and 𝑑
2?̃?𝑣/𝑑?̃?𝑖
2 < 0 in the normal region as well as the fact that 𝑞𝑖
′𝑛𝑒 ≥ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒, 
then we have 
∑ 𝛽(
𝑁𝑖
𝑁
?̃?𝑣
𝑛𝑒
− 𝑁𝑖
𝑣𝑛𝑒)
𝐼
𝑖=1
≥ ∑
𝑁𝑖
𝑁
𝛽(?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒 − 𝑞𝑖
′𝑛𝑒)
𝑑?̃?𝑣
𝑑?̃?𝑖
|?̃?𝑖=?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒
𝐼
𝑖=1
≥ ∑
𝑁𝑖
𝑁
𝛽(?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒 − 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒)
𝑑?̃?𝑣
𝑑?̃?𝑖
|?̃?𝑖=?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒
𝐼
𝑖=1
 
Combining the results yields 
?̃?𝑛𝑒 − 𝑆𝑛𝑒 ≥ ∑(?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒 − 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒)(𝐵(?̃?𝑛𝑒) +
𝑁𝑖
𝑁
𝛽
𝑑?̃?𝑣
𝑑?̃?𝑖
|?̃?𝑖=?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒)
𝐼
𝑖=1
 
Substituting first-order conditions (31) and (32) into the above inequation obtains 
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?̃?𝑛𝑒 − 𝑆𝑛𝑒 ≥ −𝐵′(?̃?𝑛𝑒) ∑(?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒 − 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒)?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒
𝐼
𝑖=1
+  ?̃?(?̃?𝑛𝑒 − 𝑄𝑛𝑒) (66) 
The minimum value of ∑ (?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒 − 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒)?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝐼
𝑖=1  is (?̃?
𝑛𝑒 − 𝑄𝑛𝑒)?̃?𝑛𝑒/𝐼, which follows readily from the first-
order conditions of the following problem. 
min 𝑍 = ∑(?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒 − 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒)?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒
𝐼
𝑖=1
 
subject to 
𝑄𝑛𝑒 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒
𝐼
𝑖=1
, 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒 > 0 
?̃?𝑛𝑒 = ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒
𝐼
𝑖=1
, ?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒 > 0 
Then we obtain 
?̃?𝑛𝑒 − 𝑆𝑛𝑒 ≥ −
𝐵′(?̃?𝑛𝑒)(?̃?𝑛𝑒 − 𝑄𝑛𝑒)?̃?𝑛𝑒
𝐼
+ ?̃?(?̃?𝑛𝑒 − 𝑄𝑛𝑒) 
Based on the fact that ?̃?𝑛𝑒 > 𝑄𝑛𝑒 from Lemma 2 and the fact that 𝐵′(?̃?𝑛𝑒) < 0, we arrive at ?̃?𝑛𝑒 > 𝑆𝑛𝑒 , 𝐼 ≥
2. 
With regard to the profit, define 
𝑃𝑛𝑒 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒(𝐵(𝑄𝑛𝑒) − 𝛽(𝑇 + 𝑊𝑖
𝑛𝑒) − ?̃?)
𝐼
𝑖=1
− 𝑐𝑁 
?̃?𝑛𝑒 = ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒(𝐵(?̃?𝑛𝑒) − 𝛽(?̃? + ?̃?𝑛𝑒) − ?̃?)
𝐼
𝑖=1
− 𝑐𝑁 
Then we have 
?̃?𝑛𝑒 − 𝑃𝑛𝑒 = ?̃?𝑛𝑒𝐵(?̃?𝑛𝑒) − 𝑄𝑛𝑒𝐵(𝑄𝑛𝑒) + ∑ 𝛽 (
𝑁𝑖
𝑁
?̃?𝑣
𝑛𝑒
− 𝑁𝑖
𝑣𝑛𝑒)
𝐼
𝑖=1
− ?̃?(?̃?𝑛𝑒 − 𝑄𝑛𝑒) 
= (?̃?𝑛𝑒 − 𝑄𝑛𝑒)𝐵(?̃?𝑛𝑒) + ∑ 𝛽 (
𝑁𝑖
𝑁
?̃?𝑣
𝑛𝑒
− 𝑁𝑖
𝑣𝑛𝑒)
𝐼
𝑖=1
+ 𝑄𝑛𝑒 (𝐵(?̃?𝑛𝑒) − 𝐵(𝑄𝑛𝑒)) − ?̃?(?̃?𝑛𝑒
− 𝑄𝑛𝑒) 
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≥ −𝐵′(?̃?𝑛𝑒) ∑(?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒 − 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑒)?̃?𝑖
𝑛𝑒
𝐼
𝑖=1
+ 𝑄𝑛𝑒 (𝐵(?̃?𝑛𝑒) − 𝐵(𝑄𝑛𝑒)) 
 
Appendix D. Proof of Lemma 3. 
Clearly, we have 𝑄𝑠𝑜 = ?̃?𝑠𝑜 , 𝐼 = 1. 
consider the following waiting time function 
𝑊(𝑁𝑣) = 𝐴(𝑁𝑣)−𝜅 (67) 
First-order derivative with respect 𝑁𝑣 
𝑊′(𝑁𝑣) = −𝜅𝐴(𝑁𝑣)−(𝜅+1) (68) 
Define 
𝑓𝐼(𝑥) =
𝑁 − 𝑥
?̃? + 𝑊(𝑥)
, 𝑥 > 0 (69) 
First-order and second-order derivative with respect 𝑥 
𝑓𝐼
′(𝑥) = −
1 + 𝑓𝐼(𝑥)𝑊
′(𝑥)
?̃? + 𝑊(𝑥)
(70) 
𝑓𝐼
′′(𝑥) =
2𝑊′(𝑥) (1 + 𝑓𝐼(𝑥)𝑊
′(𝑥)) − (𝑁 − 𝑥)𝑊′′(𝑥)
(?̃? + 𝑊(𝑥))
2  
Suppose 𝑞𝑗
𝑠𝑜 ≥
1
𝐼
𝑄𝑠𝑜 > 0 , based on the definitions (55)  and (69) , we have 𝑄𝑠𝑜 = 𝑓𝐼(?̃?
𝑣 𝑠𝑜)  and 
𝑞𝑗
𝑠𝑜=𝑓𝑗(𝑁𝑗
𝑣 𝑠𝑜). If ∀𝑗, 𝑞𝑗
𝑠𝑜 ≥
1
𝐼
𝑄𝑠𝑜, it meets ?̃?𝑠𝑜 > 𝐼𝑞𝑗
𝑠𝑜, then clearly we have ?̃?𝑠𝑜 > 𝑄𝑠𝑜. 
Otherwise, if ∃𝑗, ?̃?𝑠𝑜 ≤ 𝐼𝑞𝑗
𝑠𝑜, then it holds 
1 + 𝑓𝐼(?̃?
𝑣 𝑠𝑜)𝑊′(?̃?𝑣
𝑠𝑜
) ≥ 1 + 𝐼𝑓𝑗(𝑁𝑗
𝑣 𝑠𝑜)𝑊′(?̃?𝑗
𝑣 𝑠𝑜) 
= 1 − 𝜅𝐴𝐼𝑓𝑗(𝑁𝑗
𝑣 𝑠𝑜)(?̃?𝑗
𝑣 𝑠𝑜)
−(𝜅+1)
 
> 1 − 𝜅𝐴𝑓𝑗(𝑁𝑗
𝑣 𝑠𝑜)(𝑁𝑗
𝑣 𝑠𝑜)
−(𝜅+1)
 
= 1 + 𝑓𝑗(𝑁𝑗
𝑣 𝑠𝑜) 𝑊′(𝑁𝑗
𝑣 𝑠𝑜) 
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where from top to bottom, follows from the fact that 𝑞𝑗
𝑠𝑜 ≥
1
𝐼
𝑄𝑠𝑜 and ?̃?𝑣
𝑠𝑜
≥ ?̃?𝑗
𝑣 𝑠𝑜, from the definition (70) 
of 𝑊′(?̃?𝑗
𝑣 𝑠𝑜), from the assumption that ?̃?𝑣
𝑠𝑜
≥ 𝑁𝑗
𝑣 𝑠𝑜 and the fact that 𝐼 ≥ 2, and from the definition (70) 
of 𝑊′(𝑁𝑗
𝑣 𝑠𝑜). 
Using first-order conditions (12) and (44), the definitions (56) and (70), we have 
𝐵(?̃?𝑠𝑜) = −𝛽
𝑑?̃?𝑣
𝑑?̃?
|?̃?=?̃?𝑠𝑜 = −𝛽
1
𝑓𝐼
′(?̃?𝑣
𝑠𝑜
)
=
𝛽 (𝑇 + 𝑊(?̃?𝑣
𝑠𝑜
))
1 + 𝑓𝐼(?̃?𝑣
𝑠𝑜
)𝑊′(?̃?𝑣
𝑠𝑜
)
 
𝐵(𝑄𝑠𝑜) = −𝛽
𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑣
𝑑𝑞𝑗
|𝑞𝑗=𝑞𝑗
𝑠𝑜 = −𝛽
1
𝑓𝑗
′(𝑁𝑗
𝑣 𝑠𝑜)
=
𝛽 (𝑇 + 𝑊(𝑁𝑗
𝑣 𝑠𝑜))
1 + 𝑓𝑗(𝑁𝑗
𝑣 𝑠𝑜)𝑊′(𝑁𝑗
𝑣 𝑠𝑜)
 
Finally, we arrive at 𝐵(?̃?𝑠𝑜) < 𝐵(𝑄𝑠𝑜) based on the assumption that ?̃?𝑣
𝑠𝑜
≥ 𝑁𝑗
𝑣 𝑠𝑜. Because 𝐵(∙) is strictly 
decreasing, we obtain ?̃?𝑠𝑜 > 𝑄𝑠𝑜. 
 
Appendix E. Proof of Theorem 2. 
At social optimum, proceeding as the same as the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix C, we can prove 
?̃?𝑠𝑜 − 𝑆𝑠𝑜 ≥ ∑(?̃?𝑖
𝑠𝑜 − 𝑞𝑖
𝑠𝑜)(𝐵(?̃?𝑠𝑜) +
𝑁𝑖
𝑁
𝛽
𝑑?̃?𝑣
𝑑?̃?𝑖
|?̃?𝑖=?̃?𝑖
𝑠𝑜)
𝐼
𝑖=1
 
Based on first-order conditions (35) and (36) and the fact ?̃?𝑖
𝑠𝑜 > 0, ∀𝑖, we have 
𝐵(?̃?𝑠𝑜) +
𝑁𝑖
𝑁
𝛽
𝑑?̃?𝑣
𝑑?̃?𝑖
|?̃?𝑖=?̃?𝑖
𝑠𝑜 = 0 
Thus, we arrive at ?̃?𝑠𝑜 ≥ 𝑆𝑠𝑜. 
